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Abstract
Quantum set theory (QST) and topos quantum theory (TQT) are two long running projects
in the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics that share a great deal of conceptual
and technical affinity. Most pertinently, both approaches attempt to resolve some of the con-
ceptual difficulties surrounding quantum mechanics by reformulating parts of the theory inside
of non-classical mathematical universes, albeit with very different internal logics. We call such
mathematical universes, together with those mathematical and logical structures within them
that are pertinent to the physical interpretation, ‘Q-worlds’. Here, we provide a unifying fra-
mework that allows us to (i) better understand the relationship between different Q-worlds,
and (ii) define a general method for transferring concepts and results between TQT and QST,
thereby significantly increasing the expressive power of both approaches. Along the way, we
develop a novel connection to paraconsistent logic and introduce a new class of structures that
have significant implications for recent work on paraconsistent set theory.
1 Introduction
The idea that the conceptually and philosophically challenging aspects of quantum mechanics
(QM) can be understood and even resolved via the adoption of some suitably non-classical
logic has been an influential one. In particular, Birkhoff and von Neumann’s [3] contention
that the distributive law is not generally applicable to the description of quantum systems
led to the emergence of quantum logic as an important research program in logic, quantum
foundations and the philosophy of science.1
One possibility created by the logical perspective on QM is to construct non-classical mat-
hematical universes (i.e. models of set theory, toposes, etc.) whose internal logic is non-
classical and suitably ‘quantum’, and inside of which one can reformulate parts of the theory
in a novel and illuminating way. We will call such a mathematical universe, together with
those internal logical and mathematical structures that are relevant for the quantum physical
interpretation, a ‘Q-world’.
The first example of such Q-worlds arose from a result of Takeuti [31], who showed that for
any quantum system, there exists a set theoretic universe2 whose real numbers are in bijective
correspondence with the physical quantities associated with that system. These models were
subsequently generalised by Ozawa and others (see e.g. Ozawa [25, 27, 28], Titani [32]) to
1For discussions of the philosophical aspects of quantum logic, see e.g. Putnam [22], Dummett [9], Gibbins [12].
2Based on the quantum logic associated with that system.
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set-theoretic structures with non-distributive internal logics. The study of these structures has
come to be known as ‘quantum set theory’ (QST). The fact that the real numbers in those
structures are in bijective correspondence with the set of all physical quantities associated with
the given quantum system allows one to reformulate the physics of the system in the internal
language of the structures.
The second example, first studied by Isham [15], is given by the topos-theoretic reformu-
lation of quantum mechanics. The relevant foundational result here is the reformulation of the
Kochen-Specker theorem as a result about the non-existence of global sections of the ‘spectral
presheaf’ of a quantum system (see e.g. Isham and Butterfield [16]). Building on this result,
the topos-theoretic approach progresses to reformulate quantum mechanics inside of a parti-
cular type of presheaf topos. Unlike the Q-worlds studied by Takeuti, Ozawa and others, these
‘quantum toposes’ have a distributive, intuitionistic internal logic. For some of the literature
studying the technical and conceptual implications of reformulating standard Hilbert space
quantum mechanics in the topos-theoretic setting, see e.g. Isham and Butterfield [16], Do¨ring
and Isham [8], Do¨ring [7], and references therein. We will call this approach ‘topos quantum
theory’ (TQT for short).
Until now, the tantalising prospect of unifying these two (kinds of) Q-worlds, non-distributive
set theoretic QST and distributive topos-theoretic TQT, within a single formal setting has gone
almost completely unexplored (the prospect was first tentatively suggested by Eva [10]). In
the present article we develop such a generalised framework and present a number of results
that connect QST and TQT. Quite unexpectedly,3 the bridge between the Q-worlds of TQT and
those of QST turns out to be via paraconsistent set theory.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls some basic ideas from non-distributive
quantum logic. In section 3 we provide a concise introduction to algebraic valued models of
set theory in general, and to QST in particular, summarising the key results of the approach.
In section 4 we outline the key ideas of the topos-theoretic reformulation of quantum mecha-
nics, focusing especially on the approach’s distributive logical structure. Section 5 contains the
first original contributions of the paper. In particular, we show that embedding standard non-
distributive quantum logic into the intuitionistic logic of TQT naturally results in a novel form
of paraconsistent quantum logic. After proving a number of new results about the relationship
between these different forms of quantum logic, we go on define a new class of paraconsis-
tent Q-worlds in section 6.1. We then prove transfer theorems that guarantee the satisfaction
of large fragments of classical mathematics inside of these Q-worlds, thereby making an im-
portant contribution to the study of inconsistent mathematics and paraconsistent set theory.4
Section 6 shows how these new Q-worlds can be seen as a bridge between the Q-worlds of
TQT and QST, and uses them to transfer a number of results between the two settings. Section
7 concludes.
2 Orthomodular Quantum Logic
The logical structure of classical physics can be summarised in the following way. To any
classical physical system S we can associate a corresponding space S of possible physical
states of S. A ‘physical proposition’ pertaining to S is a statement of the form “the value
3... at least for us, at the beginning of our explorations...
4As studied, for example, by Weber [33, 34], McKubre-Jordens and Weber [34].
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of the physical quantity A for S lies in the Borel set δ ⊆ R”.5 Physical propositions of this
form are in bijective correspondence (modulo logical equivalence) with measurable subsets of
the state space S. In particular, each physical proposition corresponds to the set of all states
that make that proposition true, which is measurable (and any measurable set of states defines
a corresponding physical proposition). Since the measurable subsets of S form a complete
Boolean algebra under the usual set theoretic operations (modulo sets of Lebesgue measure 0),
we can conclude that the logic governing the physical propositions associated with a classical
system S is classical.
The situation is very different in QM. Given a quantum system S, the space of states is
always assumed to be a Hilbert space H, and physical quantities (e.g. angular momentum,
position, mass etc) are represented not as real valued functions onH, but rather as self-adjoint
operators on H. The spectral theorem for self-adjoint operators tells us that physical propo-
sitions (statements about the values of physical quantities) are in bijective correspondence up
to logical equivalence with the closed subspaces of H or, equivalently, with projection opera-
tors onto the closed subspaces of H. Thus the logical structure of the physical propositions
associated with a quantum system is given by the lattice of projection operators on the corre-
sponding Hilbert space. But since closed subspaces are not closed under unions, this is not a
simple subset algebra. In particular, although we can take the meet6 of two subspaces to be
the intersection, we need to define the join of two subspaces as the closed linear sum, not the
union. And as Birkhoff and von Neumann pointed out [3], these two operations do not satisfy
the distributive laws, i.e.
a ∨ (b ∧ b) = (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c),
a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c),
are not guaranteed to hold where a, b, c are subspaces of a Hilbert space H and ∧,∨ are the
lattice operations given by intersection and closed linear sum, respectively. So, in the standard
Hilbert space formulation of QM, the logic governing the physical propositions associated with
a quantum system is non-distributive. Given the central role played by the distributive law in
classical and intuitionistic logic, this suggests a radically non-classical form of quantum logic.
The strongest analogue of distributivity that is generally satisfied by the algebra of pro-
jections on a Hilbert space is known as the orthomodular law. Before stating the law, note that
the lattice P(H) of projections on a Hilbert space H also comes equipped with a canonical
orthocomplementation operation ⊥ : P(H) → P(H) that takes each subspace to its ortho-
gonal complement. This orthocomplementation operation is fully classical in the sense that it
satisfies excluded middle (i.e. a ∨ a⊥ = >, where > is the identity operator, the projection
onto the whole of Hilbert space, and hence the top element of P(H)) and non-contradiction
(i.e. a∧a⊥ = ⊥, where⊥ is the zero projection onto the null subspace,7 and hence the bottom
element in P(H)), and is an involution (i.e. a ≤ b implies a⊥ ≥ b⊥).
Definition 1. An orthocomplemented lattice L is called orthomodular if and only if for any
5For instance, the sentences “the momentum of the system S is between 0 and 1 (in suitable units)” and “the
velocity of S is less than 5” are examples of physical propositions pertaining to S.
6We use ‘meet’ and ‘join’ to refer to the lattice-theoretic operations of greatest lower bound and least upper bound,
respectively.
7Throughout the paper, we will use > and ⊥ to denote the maximal and minimal elements of the relevant lat-
tice/algebra, respectively. We trust that the context will make it clear which algebra > and ⊥ inhabit. We also trust
that no confusion will arise between (the notation for) the bottom element and the orthocomplementation operation.
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a, b ∈ L, a ≤ b implies that there exists a Boolean sublattice B ⊆ L such that a, b ∈ B.8 An
orthomodular lattice L is called complete if meets and joins of arbitrary families of elements
in L exist.
It is a basic result that the projection operators on a Hilbert space always form a complete
orthomodular lattice (complete OML). Thus, quantum logic is standardly characterised as the
study of logical systems whose algebraic semantics are given by complete OML’s. However, a
number of new technical and conceptual difficulties arise once one moves to a non-distributive
setting. One issue that will be important for our purposes concerns the definition of a canonical
implication operation. It is well known that any distributive lattice uniquely defines a corre-
sponding implication operation. But once we surrender distributivity, the choice of implication
operation is no longer obvious. Hardegree [13] identifies three ‘quantum material’ implication
connectives characterized by the minimal implicative criteria for any orthomodular lattice.
Definition 2. The quantum material implication connectives on an orthomodular lattice are
the following:
(i) (Sasaki conditional) a→S b = a⊥ ∨ (a ∧ b).
(ii) (Contrapositive Sasaki conditional) a→C b = b⊥ →S a⊥.
(iii) (Relevance conditional) a→R b = (a→S b) ∧ (a→C b).
Hardegree [13] proved that these are the only three orthomodular polynomial connectives
satisfying the the minimal implicative criteria: (1) modus ponens and modus tollens and (2)
reflecting and preserving order, i.e a ≤ b if and only if a→ b = >.
3 QST: The Basics
We turn now to providing a concise introduction to QST. Firstly, we need to recall some facts
about algebraic valued models of set theory.
3.1 Boolean Valued Models
Boolean valued models of set theory were originally developed in the 1960’s by Scott, Solovay
and Vopenka, as a way of providing a novel perspective on the independence proofs of Paul
Cohen.9 Intuitively, they can be thought of as generalizations of the usual universe V (the
‘ground model’) of classical set theory (ZFC).
To see this, assume, by recursion, that for any set x in the ground model V of ZFC, there
exists a unique corresponding characteristic function fx such that x ⊆ dom(fx) and ∀y ∈
dom(fx)((fx(y) = 1↔ y ∈ x) ∧ (fx(y) = 0↔ y /∈ x)). This assignment allows us to think
of V as a class of two-valued functions from itself into the two valued Boolean algebra 2 =
{0, 1}. This can all be done rigorously with the following definition, by transfinite recursion
on α:
V (2)α = {x : func(x) ∧ ran(x) ⊆ 2 ∧ ∃ξ < α(dom(x) ⊆ V (2)ξ )}.
8Note that this definition is equivalent to the more common, but less instructive algebraic definition, which says
that a ≤ b implies a = a ∨ (b⊥ ∧ a) in an OML.
9For a complete survey of the approach, see Bell [1].
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Then, we collect each stage of the hierarchy into a single universe by defining the class term
V (2) =
⋃
α
V (2)α .
This allows us to give the following intuitive characterisation of elements of V (2):
x ∈ V (2) iff func(x) ∧ ran(x) ⊆ 2 ∧ dom(x) ⊆ V (2).
So far, we have simply taken the usual ground model of ZFC and built an equivalent re-
formalisation of it with no apparent practical purpose. However, we are now in a position to
ask another interesting question. What happens if, rather than considering functions into the
two-element Boolean algebra, 2, we generalise and consider functions whose range is inclu-
ded in an arbitrary but fixed complete Boolean algebra (CBA), B? In this case, we obtain the
following definition.
Definition 3. Given a CBA B, the Boolean valued model generated by B is the structure
V (B) =
⋃
α V
(B)
α , where
V (B)α = {x : func(x) ∧ ran(x) ⊆ B ∧ ∃ξ < α(dom(x) ⊆ V (B)ξ )}.
Now, the natural question to ask here is whether or not these generalised Boolean valued
models still provide us with a model of ZFC, and if so, whether the model we obtain in this way
has properties that differ from those of the ground model. But we are not yet in a position to
provide a sensible answer to that question. For, we do not yet have access to a clear description
of what it means for a sentence φ of the language of set theory to hold or fail to hold in V (B) for
an arbitrary fixed CBA B. So, our immediate task is to define a suitable satisfaction relation
for formulae of the language in V (B).10 We do this by assigning to each sentence φ of the
language an element ‖φ‖B of B, called the ‘Boolean truth value’ of φ.11 We proceed via
induction on the complexity of formulae.
Suppose that Boolean truth values have already been assigned to all atomic B-sentences
(sentences of the form u = v, u ∈ v, for u, v ∈ V (B)). Then, for B-sentences φ and ψ, we set
(i) ‖φ ∧ ψ‖ = ‖φ‖ ∧ ‖ψ‖
(ii) ‖φ ∨ ψ‖ = ‖φ‖ ∨ ‖ψ‖
(iii) ‖¬φ‖ = ¬‖φ‖
(iv) ‖φ→ ψ‖ = ‖φ‖ ⇒ ‖ψ‖
where ¬ and⇒ represent the complementation and implication operations of B. If φ(x) is a
B-formula with one free variable x such that ‖φ(u)‖ has already been defined for all u ∈ V (B),
we define
(v) ‖∀xφ(x)‖ =
∧
u∈V (B)
‖φ(u)‖
(vi) ‖∃xφ(x)‖ =
∨
u∈V (B)
‖φ(u)‖
10Of course, we augment the language L of ZFC by adding names for the elements of V (B). We call formulae and
sentences in this language ‘B-formulae’ and ‘B-sentences’, respectively.
11We omit the superscript from ‖φ‖B when the CBA B is clear from context.
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We also define ‘bounded’ quantifiers ∃x ∈ v and ∀x ∈ v for every v ∈ V (B) as
(vii) ‖∀x ∈ v φ(x)‖ =
∧
u∈dom(v)
(v(u)⇒ ‖φ(u)‖)
(viii) ‖∃x ∈ v φ(x)‖ =
∨
u∈dom(v)
(v(u) ∧ ‖φ(u)‖)
So it only remains to define Boolean truth values for atomic B-sentences. For technical
reasons, it turns out that the following simultaneous definition is best.
(ix) ‖u ∈ v‖ = ‖∃y ∈ v (u = y)‖
(x) ‖u = v‖ = ‖∀x ∈ u (x ∈ v)‖ ∧ ‖∀y ∈ v (y ∈ u)‖
We have now defined Boolean truth values for all B-sentences. We say that a B-sentence
σ ‘holds’, ‘is true’, or ‘is satisfied’ in V (B) if and only if ‖σ‖ = >. In this case, we write
V (B) |= σ. This is our satisfaction relation. We are now able to ask whether or not V (B) is a
model of ZFC. All we have to do is take each axiom and check to see if its Boolean truth value
is >. The basic theorem of Boolean valued set theory12 is that this is indeed the case. All the
axioms of ZFC hold in V (B), regardless of which CBA you choose as your truth value set B.
However, although all CBA’s agree on the truth of the axioms of ZFC, they do not generally
agree on the truth of all set theoretic sentences. This is what makes Boolean valued models
useful for independence proofs. For example, there are certain choices of B that will make
V (B) a model of the continuum hypothesis (CH), and certain choices that will make V (B) a
model of ¬CH, which demonstrates the independence of CH from the standard axioms of ZFC.
The following embedding of V into V (B) (for arbitrary but fixed B) will play an important
role in later sections.
ˆ: V → V (B),
x 7→ xˆ,
where xˆ = {〈yˆ,>〉 | y ∈ x}, i.e. dom(x) = {yˆ | y ∈ x} and xˆ assigns the value > to
every element of its domain. It is easily shown13 that this embedding satisfies the following
properties: {
x ∈ y iff ‖xˆ ∈ yˆ‖ = >,
x /∈ y iff ‖xˆ ∈ yˆ‖ = ⊥.{
x = y iff ‖xˆ = yˆ‖ = >,
x = y iff ‖xˆ = yˆ‖ = ⊥.
These properties allow us to establish the following useful results:14
(1) Given a ∆0-formula φ with n free variables, and x1, ..., xn ∈ V , φ(x1, ..., xn) ↔
V (B) |= φ(xˆ1, ..., xˆn).
12For details and a proof, see chapter 1 of Bell [1].
13See chapter 1 of Bell [1].
14Where ∆0-formulae contain only restricted quantifiers and Σ1-formulae contain no unrestricted universal quanti-
fiers.
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(2) Given a Σ1-formula φ with n free variables, and x1, ..., xn ∈ V , φ(x1, ..., xn) →
V (B) |= φ(xˆ1, ..., xˆn).
Since V (B) is a full model of ZFC, it is possible to construct representations of all the usual
objects of classical mathematics inside of V (B). For now, we will be concerned with the real
numbers. Specifically, note that the formula defining the predicate R(x) (‘x is a Dedekind real
number in V (B)’) is the following.
R(x) := ∀y ∈ x(y ∈ Qˆ)∧∃y ∈ Qˆ(y ∈ x) ∧ ∃y ∈ Qˆ(y /∈ x)∧
∀y ∈ Qˆ(y ∈ x↔ ∃z ∈ Qˆ(z < y ∧ z ∈ x)),
where z < y is shorthand for the formula (z, y) ∈ Rˆ, where R is the ordering on Q, i.e.,
(z, y) ∈ R if and only if z ∈ Q, y ∈ Q, and z < y. Since this is a ∆0-formula, we know that
for any x ∈ V , V (B) |= R(xˆ)↔ x ∈ R. We can use the following definition to construct ‘the
set of all real numbers in V (B)’.
Definition 4. Define R(B) ⊂ V (B) by
R(B) = {u ∈ V (B)| dom(u) = dom(Qˆ) ∧ ‖R(u)‖ = >}.
Note that R(B) is actually not an element of the model V (B). However, we can easily
represent R(B) inside of V (B) in the following way.
Definition 5. Define RB ∈ V (B) by
RB = R(B) × {>}.
Think of RB as the ‘internal representation’ of the real numbers in the model V (B).
3.2 Boolean Valued Models Generated by Projection Algebras
Returning to the quantum setting, suppose that we are considering a quantum system repre-
sented by a fixed Hilbert space H with a corresponding orthomodular lattice of projection
operators P(H). Then, we can choose a complete Boolean subalgebra B of P(H) and build
the associated Boolean valued model V (B) in the usual way. The following theorem (due to
Takeuti [30]) is the basic founding result of QST.
Theorem 1. If B is a complete Boolean subalagebra of the lattice P(H) of projections on a
given Hilbert spaceH, then the set R(B) of all real numbers in the corresponding model V (B)
is isomorphic to the set SA(B) of all self-adjoint operators on H whose spectral projections
all lie in B.
Intuitively, a Boolean subalgebra B ⊆ P(H) corresponds to a set of commuting observa-
bles for the relevant quantum system.15 Commutativity ensures that it is always, in principle,
possible to measure these observables at the same time. Thus, any such subalgebra can be
thought of as a classical measurement context or a classical perspective on the quantum sy-
stem. If we think only about the physical propositions included inB, we can reason classically
without running into any strange quantum paradoxes. It is only when we try to extend the
algebra to include non-commuting projections that things start to go wrong.
15Of course, B can contain eigenprojections for non-commuting operators, but then the idea is that these operators
can be simultaneously measured, to the degree of accuracy determined by the uncertainty relations [24].
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Theorem 1 tells us that, to each classical measurement context B, there corresponds a
set-theoretic universe in which the real numbers are isomorphic to the algebra of physical
quantities that we can talk about in that measurement context. This is a deep and enticing
result that suggests the possibility of finding mathematical universes whose internal structures
are uniquely well suited to describing the physics of specific quantum systems. Towards this
end, it is natural to ask whether one can find a model M such that the real numbers in M are
isomorphic not just to the set SA(B) of self-adjoint operators whose spectral projections lie in
a Boolean subalgebra B, but rather to the whole set SA(H) of all self-adjoint operators on the
Hilbert spaceH associated with a given system. Such a model would truly encode the physics
of the given system in a complete and robust manner.
3.3 Orthomodular Valued Models
In order to obtain the desired extension of theorem 1, it is natural to embed the individual
Boolean valued models V (B) (B ⊆ P(H)) within the larger structure V (P(H)). This is the
strategy introduced by Takeuti [31] and subsequently studied by Ozawa (see e.g. Ozawa [25,
26, 27, 28]), Titani ([32]) and others. But of course, since P(H) is a non-distributive lattice,
V (P(H)) will not be a full model of any well known set theory. However, Ozawa [25] proved a
theorem transfer principle that guarantees the satisfaction of significant fragments of classical
mathematics within V (P(H)). We turn now to outlining this useful result. First, we need some
basic definitions.
Definition 6. Given a, b ∈ P(H), we say that a and b commute, or a|b if a = (a∧b)∨(a∧b⊥).
Definition 6 provides a lattice theoretic generalisation of the notion of commuting opera-
tors.
Definition 7. Given an arbitrary subset A ⊆ P(H), let
A! = {a ∈ P(H)|a|b,∀b ∈ A}.
We call A! the commutant of A since it consists of all the elements of P(H) that commute
with everything in A.
Definition 8. Given an arbitrary subset A ⊆ P(H), let
q(A) =
∨
{a ∈ A!|(b1 ∧ a)|(b2 ∧ a),∀b1, b2 ∈ A}.
Definition 9. Given u ∈ V (P(H)), define the support of u, L(u), by the following transfinite
recursion.
L(u) =
⋃
x∈dom(u)
L(x) ∪ {u(x)|x ∈ dom(u)}.
For any A ⊆ V (P(H)), we will write L(A) for ⋃u∈A L(u), and for any u1, ..., un ∈
V (P(H)), we write L(u1, ..., un) for L({u1, ..., un}).
Definition 10. Given A ⊆ V (P(H)), define ∨(A), the commutator of A, by
∨(A) = q(L(A)).
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Intuitively, ∨(u1, ..., un) measures the extent to which the orthomodular-valued sets u1, ..., un ∈
V (P(H)) ‘commute’ with each other. It is a generalisation of the usual operator theoretic notion
of a commutator to the set theoretic setting [25, Theorem 5.4].
Before stating Ozawa’s [25, 28] ‘ZFC transfer principle’, we need to note an important sub-
tlety that arises when one studies orthomodular valued models. Recall definition 2, according
to which any orthomodular lattice comes equipped with at least three equally plausible impli-
cation connectives. When we were defining the semantics for Boolean valued models, the truth
values of conditional sentences were always uniquely determined because of the existence of a
single canonical Boolean implication connective. But when we define the set-theoretic seman-
tics for V (P(H)), it is always necessary to specify a particular choice of implication. We denote
the Sasaki, contrapositive and relevance implications by⇒j where j ∈ {S,C,R}. Similarly,
when we want to specify the implication connective used to define the semantics on V (P(H)),
we write ‖φ‖j to denote the truth values of sentences under that semantics.
Theorem 2. For any ∆0-formula φ(x1, ..., xn) and any u1, ..., un ∈ V (P(H)), if φ(x1, ..., xn)
is provable in ZFC then
∨(u1, ..., un) ≤ ‖φ(u1, ...un)‖j
for j = S,R,C.
Theorem 2 allows us to recover large fragments of classical mathematics within ‘commu-
tative regions’ of V (P(H)) (and also limits the non-classicality of ‘non-commutative regions’).
Although V (P(H)) is certainly not a full model of ZFC, theorem 2 will allow us to model sig-
nificant parts of classical mathematics within V (P(H)). It is also important to note that the
proof of theorem 2 is independent of our choice of quantum material implication connective
on P(H) [28].
Just as we used definitions 4 and 5 to construct the real numbers for Boolean valued models,
it is possible to construct R(P(H)), RP(H) in the same way. Using theorem 2, Ozawa [25, 26,
27] proves a number of useful results characterising the behaviour of RP(H).
Recall that the purpose of studying the structure V (P(H)) was to establish a bijection bet-
weenR(P(H)) and the set SA(H) of all self-adjoint operators onH. This is also done in Ozawa
[25, 27].
Theorem 3. Given a Hilbert spaceH, there exists a bijection between SA(H) and R(P(H)).
In summary then, given a quantum system with a corresponding Hilbert space H, we can
build the set-theoretic structure V (P(H)). We know that distributive regions of V (P(H)) behave
classically in the sense characterised by theorem 2, and we also know that the real numbers in
V (P(H)) are in bijective correspondence with the physical quantities associated with the given
quantum system.
4 TQT: Basic Structures and Generalised Stone Dua-
lity
We turn now to providing a basic introduction to the logical aspects of TQT. We focus especi-
ally on the version based on orthomodular lattices, first developed by Cannon [5] in her MSc
thesis and extended by Cannon and Do¨ring [6]. This version is close in most respects to the
standard version based on operators and von Neumann algebras [8], but the connections with
quantum logic and quantum set theory are even more direct in the new version.
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The philosophical motivation behind TQT is primarily to provide a ‘neo-realist’ reformu-
lation of quantum theory. Specifically, in TQT one identifies the following two properties as
characteristic of any realist theory (for an in depth discussion of the realist interpretation of
TQT, see Eva [11]).
(1) It is always possible to simultaneously assign truth values to all the physical propositions
in a coherent and non-contextual way.
(2) The logic of physical propositions is always distributive.
We have already seen that condition 2 is violated by the standard Hilbert space formalism
of QM. Furthermore, the Kochen-Specker theorem tells us that condition 1 cannot be satisfied
if the truth values in question form a Boolean algebra and the physical propositions are repre-
sented by projection operators. More precisely, the Kochen-Specker theorem shows that there
is no non-contextual assignment of classical truth values to all the elements of the projection
lattice on a Hilbert space of dimension greater than 2 that preserves the algebraic relationships
between the operators. If one defines a ‘possible world’ to be an assignment of classical truth
values to all the propositions in the algebra (e.g. a ‘row of the truth table’), then the Kochen-
Specker theorem tells us (modulo some important caveats) that there are generally no possible
worlds for quantum systems.
Of course, in classical physics, the possible worlds are given by the possible states of
the system. Any state assigns to every physical proposition a classical truth value, and any
assignment of truth values to all physical propositions uniquely defines a corresponding point
in the state space. Thus, we can represent a classical state as a Boolean algebra homomorphism
λ : B → {0, 1} from the Boolean algebra of physical propositions to the two-element Boolean
algebra, 2 = {0, 1}.
One basic aim of TQT is to reformulate the logical structure of QM in a way that satisfies
conditions 1 and 2 above. We now sketch the main steps in this enterprise.
4.1 Stone Duality and Stone Representation
Stone duality goes back to Stone’s seminal paper [29]. In modern language, Stone duality is
a dual equivalence between the category BA of Boolean algebras and the category Stone of
Stone spaces, that is, compact, totally disconnected Hausdorff spaces,
BA
Σ //
⊥ Stoneop.
cl(−)
oo
• To each Boolean algebra B, the set
ΣB := {λ : B → 2 | λ is a Boolean algebra homomorphism}
is assigned. ΣB , equipped with the topology generated by the sets Sa := {λ ∈ ΣB |
λ(a) = 1}, is called the Stone space of B. One can easily check that the sets Sa are
clopen, that is, simultaneously closed and open, so the Stone topology has a basis of
clopen sets and hence is totally disconnected.
• Conversely, to each Stone space X , the Boolean algebra cl(X) of its clopen subsets is
assigned.
This is the object level of the two functors above. For the arrows (morphisms), we have:
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• To each morphism φ : B → C of Boolean algebras, the map
Σ(φ) : ΣC −→ ΣB
λ 7−→ λ ◦ φ
is assigned.
• Conversely, to each continuous function f : X → Y between Stone spaces, the Boolean
algebra morphism
cl(f) : cl(Y ) −→ cl(X)
S 7−→ f−1(S)
is assigned.
Note the reversal of direction and ‘action by pullback’ in both cases. Stone duality comes in
different variants: there is also a dual equivalence
cBA
Σ //
⊥ Stoneanop.
cl(−)
oo
between complete Boolean algebras and their morphisms and Stonean spaces, which are extre-
mely disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces. The appropriate morphisms between Stonean
spaces are open continuous maps.
The Stone representation theorem shows that every Boolean algebraB is isomorphic to the
Boolean algebra cl(ΣB) of clopen subsets of its Stone space. The isomorphism is concretely
given by
φ : B −→ cl(ΣB)
b 7−→ Sb := {λ ∈ ΣB | λ(b) = 1}.
While being enormously useful in classical logic, Stone duality and Stone representation do
not generalise in any straighforward way to non-distributive orthomodular lattices. In a sense,
we can interpret the Kochen-Specker theorem as telling us that the (hypothetical) Stone space
of a projection lattice P(H) is generally empty. Since there are no lattice homomorphisms
from P(H) into 2, there is simply no general notion of the Stone space of an orthomodular
lattice.
This situation was remedied in [5, 6]. In this paragraph, we summarise the main results,
which will be presented in more detail in the following subsections. For full proofs and many
more details, see [5, 6]. To each orthomodular lattice L, one can associate a spectral presheaf
ΣL, which is a straigthforward generalisation of the Stone space of a Boolean algebra. The
assignment is contravariantly functorial, and ΣL is a complete invariant of L. Moreover, the
clopen subobjects of the spectral presheaf ΣL form a complete bi-Heyting algebra Subcl(ΣL),
generalising the Boolean algebra cl(ΣB) of clopen subsets of the Stone space of a Boolean
algebra B. For each complete orthomodular lattice (OML) L, there is a map called daseinisa-
tion,
δ : L −→ Subcl(ΣL)
a 7−→ δ(a),
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which provides a representation of L in Subcl(ΣL). Different from the classical case, δ is not
an isomorphism, but it is injective, monotone, join-preserving, and most importantly, it has an
adjoint ε : Subcl(ΣL) → L such that ε ◦ δ is the identity on L. Hence, the daseinisation map
δ (and its adjoint ε) provide a bridge between the orthomodular world and the topos-based
world, at least at the propositional level. In later sections, we will extend this bridge to the
level of predicate logic.
4.2 The Spectral Presheaf
Given an orthomodular lattice L, let B(L) be the set of Boolean subalgebras of L, partially
ordered by inclusion. B(L) is called the context category of L. If L is complete, it makes sense
to consider the poset Bc(L) of complete Boolean subalgebras.
Let Lat be the category of lattices and lattice morphisms, let OML denote the category
of orthomodular lattices and orthomorphisms (lattice morphisms that preserve the orthocom-
plement), and let Pos be the category of posets and monotone maps. When going from an
orthomodular lattice L to its context category B(L), seemingly a lot of information is lost.
By only considering Boolean subalgebras, any non-distributivity in L is discarded. Moreover,
since B(L) is just a poset, the inner structure of eachB ∈ B(L) as a Boolean algebra is lost (or
so it seems). Somewhat surprisingly, Harding and Navara [14] proved that B(L) is a complete
invariant of L:
Theorem 4. (Harding, Navara) Let L,M be orthomodular lattices with no 4-element blocks
(i.e., no maximal Boolean subalgebras with only 4 elements). Then L ' M in OML if and
only if B(L) ' B(M) in Pos.
We also note that every morphism φ : L → M between orthomodular lattices induces a
monotone map
φ˜ : B(L) −→ B(M)
B 7−→ φ[B].
This means that we have a (covariant) functor from OML to Pos, L→ B(L), φ→ φ˜. There
are obvious analogues of these constructions for complete OMLs.
While B(L) certainly cannot be regarded as a generalised Stone space of L, it is significant
that B(L) is a complete invariant and that the assignment L 7→ B(L) is functorial. This
suggests to consider structures built over B(L) that are related to Stone spaces. In fact, the
simplest idea works: each B ∈ B(L) is a Boolean algebra, so it has a Stone space ΣB . If
B′ ⊂ B, then there is a canonical map from ΣB to ΣB′ , given by restriction:
r(B′ ⊂ B) : ΣB −→ ΣB′
λ 7−→ λ|B′ .
It is well-known that this map is surjective and continuous with respect to the Stone topologies.
Moreover, being a quotient map between compact Hausdorff spaces, it is a closed map. If B
and B′ are complete, then ΣB and ΣB′ are Stonean and r(B′ ⊂ B) is also open.
This allows us to define a presheaf over B(L) that comprises all the ‘local’ Stone spaces
ΣB and glues them together:
Definition 11. The spectral presheaf, ΣL, of an orthomodular lattice L is the presheaf over
B(L) given
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(a) on objects: for all B ∈ B(L), ΣLB := ΣB (where ΣLB denotes the component of ΣL at
B),
(b) on arrows: for all B,B′ ∈ B(L) such that B′ ⊂ B, ΣL(B′ ⊂ B) := r(B′ ⊂ B).
If L is a complete OML, then there is an obvious analogue, the spectral presheaf of L over
Bc(L). Obviously, the spectral presheaf ΣL of an orthomodular lattice L is a generalisation of
the Stone space ΣB of a Boolean algebra B.16
In order to discuss whether the assignment L 7→ ΣL is functorial, we first have to define a
suitable category in which the spectral presheaf ΣL is an object, and the appropriate morphisms
between such presheaves. This is done in great detail in [5, 6]. One considers a category
Presh(Stone) of presheaves with values in Stone spaces, but over varying base categories.
(We saw that if L is not isomorphic to M , then their context categories B(L),B(M) are not
isomorphic, either.)17 With this in place, Cannon [5] showed:
Theorem 5. There is a contravariant functor
Σ : OML −→ Presh(Stone)
sending an object L of OML to ΣL, which is an object in Presh(Stone), and a morphism
φ : L → M in OML to a morphism 〈φ˜,Gφ〉 : ΣM → ΣL in Presh(Stone) in the opposite
direction.
If L,M are orthomodular lattices, then L ' M in Lat if and only if ΣL ' ΣM in
Presh(Stone).
Again, there is an obvious version of this result for complete OMLs. This shows that the
spectral presheaf ΣL is a complete invariant of an orthomodular lattice L, and the assignment
L → ΣL is contravariantly functorial. This strengthens the interpretation of ΣL as a generali-
sed Stone space. Yet, there are two caveats: the behaviour of the orthocomplement under the
assignment L 7→ ΣL(L) was not considered in [5] and only very briefly in [6]; this will be
done in section 5 below. More importantly, the result is weaker than a full duality, since not
every object in Presh(Stone) is in the image of the functor Σ.
4.3 The Algebra of Clopen Subobjects
Before we can generalise the Stone representation, we define Subcl(ΣL), the collection of
clopen subobjects of the spectral presheaf, and briefly consider its algebraic structure. The
guiding idea is that clopen subobjects of the spectral presheaf of an OML generalise the clopen
subsets of the Stone space of a Boolean algebra.
Definition 12. Let L be an orthomodular lattice, B(L) its context category, and ΣL its spectral
presheaf. A subobject (i.e., a subpresheaf) S of ΣL is called clopen if for all B ∈ B(L), the
component SB of S at B is a clopen subset of Σ
L
B = ΣB , the Stone space of B. The collection
of clopen subobjects is denoted Subcl(ΣL).
16For now we abide by the convention used in the literature on TQT of underlining presheaves. We will drop this
convention in section 5 to keep things neat.
17Alternatively, one could consider a category of presheaf topoi over different base categories, together with a
distinguished spectral object in each topos.
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We first observe that Subcl ΣL is a partially ordered set with a natural order given by
∀S, T ∈ Subcl ΣL : S ≤ T :⇐⇒ (∀B ∈ B(L) : SB ⊆ TB).
Clearly, the empty subobject ∅ is the bottom element and ΣL is the top element. Moreover,
meets and joins exist with respect to this order and are given as follows: for every finite family
(Si)i∈I ⊂ Subcl(ΣL) and for all B ∈ B(L),
(
∧
i∈I
Si)B =
∧
i∈I
Si;B,
(
∨
i∈I
Si)B =
∨
i∈I
Si;B,
where Si;B denotes the component of Si at B. If L is a complete OML, then we consider
the context category Bc(L) of complete Boolean sublattices and the spectral presheaf ΣL is
constructed over Bc(L). Then all meets and joins exist in Subcl(ΣL), not just finite ones, and
they are given as follows: for any family (Si)i∈I ⊆ Subcl ΣL,
(
∧
i∈I
Si)B = int(
∧
i∈I
Si;B),
(
∨
i∈I
Si)B = cls(
∨
i∈I
Si;B),
where int denotes the interior and cls the closure. For now, we go back to general OMLs.
Since meets and joins are calculated componentwise, Subcl(ΣL) is a distributive lattice.
If L is complete, finite meets distribute over arbitrary joins and vice versa. Additionally, it
is easy to show that Subcl(ΣL) is a both a Heyting algebra and a co-Heyting algebra (or
Brouwer algebra), hence a bi-Heyting algebra. If L is complete, then Subcl(ΣL) is a complete
bi-Heyting algebra [7]. The Heyting algebra structure gives an intuitionistic propositional
calculus, the co-Heyting algebra structure a paraconsistent one. The Heyting negation and the
co-Heyting negation on Subcl(ΣL) are not related closely to the orthocomplement in L, so we
will not consider them further. Instead, we will define a third negation on Subcl(ΣL) in section
5 that indeed is closely related to the orthocomplement in L and will prove very useful.
4.4 Representing a Complete Orthomodular Lattice in the Alge-
bra of Clopen Subobjects by Daseinisation
From now on, we specialise to complete orthomodular lattices. We aim to generalise the Stone
representation by defining a suitable map from a complete OML L to the algebra Subcl(ΣL)
of clopen subobjects of its spectral presheaf.
Let a ∈ L, and let B ∈ Bc(L) be a (complete) context. If a ∈ B, then we simply use the
standard Stone representation and assign the clopen subset Sa = {λ ∈ ΣB | λ(a) = 1} of
ΣLB = ΣB to it. Yet, if a /∈ B, then we have to approximate a in L first: define
δB(a) :=
∧
{b ∈ B | b ≥ a}.
The meet exists in B, since B is complete. δB(a) is the smallest element of B that dominates
a. By the Stone representation, there is a clopen subset of ΣB corresponding to δB(a), given
by SδB(a) = {λ ∈ ΣB | λ(δB(a)) = 1}. In this way, we obtain one clopen subset in each
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component ΣB of the spectral presheaf, where B varies over Bc(L). It is straightforward to
check that these clopen subsets form a clopen subobject (see [5, 6]), which we denote by δ(a),
∀B ∈ Bc(L) : δ(a)B = SδB(a).
We call δ(a) ∈ Subcl(ΣL) the daseinisation of a.
Proposition 6. Let L be a complete orthomodular lattice, Bc(L) its complete context category,
ΣL its spectral presheaf, and Subcl(ΣL) the complete distributive lattice of clopen subobjects
of ΣL. The daseinisation map
δ : L −→ Subcl(ΣL)
a 7−→ δ(a)
has the following properties:
(i) δ is injective, but not surjective,
(ii) δ is monotone,
(iii) δ preserves bottom and top elements,
(iv) δ preserves all joins, i.e., for any family (ai)i∈I ⊆ L, it holds that∨
i∈I
δ(ai) = δ(
∨
i∈I
ai).
(v) for meets, we have δ(
∧
i∈I
ai) ≤
∧
i∈I
δ(ai).
Proof. (i)–(iii) are easy to prove. (iv) follows since meets and joins are calculated component-
wise, and δB : L → B is the left adjoint of the inclusion B ↪→ L, so δB preserves colimits,
which are joins. (v) is a consequence of (ii).
The map δ : L → Subcl(ΣL) is our generalisation of the Stone representation B →
cl(ΣB). Different from the Stone representation, δ is not an isomorphism, and it cannot be,
since L is non-distributive in general, while Subcl(ΣL) is distributive. Yet, since δ is injective,
no information is lost.
Moreover, δ is a join-preserving map between complete lattices, so it has a right adjoint
ε : Subcl(Σ
L)→ L, given by
∀S ∈ Subcl(ΣL) : ε(S) =
∨
{a ∈ L | δ(a) ≤ S}
The properties of ε are analogous to those of δ:
Proposition 7. Let L be a complete orthomodular lattice, Bc(L) its complete context category,
ΣL its spectral presheaf, and Subcl(ΣL) the complete distributive lattice of clopen subobjects
of ΣL. The right adjoint ε of δ has the following properties:
(i) ε is surjective, but not injective,
(ii) ε is monotone,
(iii) ε preserves bottom and top elements,
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(iv) ε preserves all meets, i.e., for any family (Si)i∈I ⊆ Subcl(ΣL), it holds that∧
i∈I
ε(Si) = ε(
∧
i∈I
Si),
(v) for joins, we have ε(S ∨ T ) ≥ ε(S) ∨ ε(T ).
IfB ∈ Bc(L) is a context and S ∈ cl(ΣB), then we denote the element ofB corresponding
to S under the Stone representation by aS . Carmen Constantin first proved the following useful
lemma (see [5]):
Lemma 8. For all S ∈ Subcl(ΣL),
ε(S) =
∧
B∈Bc(L)
aSB .
This means that in order to calculate ε(S), we simply switch in each context from the
clopen set SB to the corresponding element aSB of B and then take the meet (in L) over all
contexts.
Corollary 9. With the notation above, ε ◦ δ = idL for any complete orthomodular lattice L.
ε can be used to define an equivalence relation on Subcl(Σ), given by S ∼ T if and
only if ε(S) = ε(T ). We let E denote the set of all equivalence classes of Subcl(Σ) under this
equivalence relation. E can be turned into a complete lattice by defining
∧
i∈I [Si] = [
∧
i∈I Si],
[S] ≤ [T ] if and only if [S] ∧ [T ] = [S] and∨i∈I [Si] = ∧{[T ] | ∀i ∈ I : [Si] ≤ [T ]}. Then it
is straightforward to show
Theorem 10. With the notation above, E and L are isomorphic as complete lattices. In parti-
cular, the maps g : E → L and f : L → E defined by g([S]) = ε(S) and f(a) = [δ(a)] are
an inverse pair of complete lattice isomorphisms.
This result can be seen as an alternative generalisation of the Stone representation theorem
to orthomodular lattices. It tells us that an orthomodular lattice can be represented isomorphi-
cally by the clopen subobjects of the spectral presheaf modulo the equivalence relation induced
by ε. Of course, the lattice E = Subcl(ΣL)/ ' is non-distributive, while Subcl(ΣL) is dis-
tributive. In the following, we will mostly consider Subcl(ΣL) as the algebra of propositions
suggested by the topos approach.
So far, we have seen that TQT allows for an alternative formalisation of the logical structure
of QM that does not require us to surrender distributivity. Furthermore, we have also seen
that the spectral presheaf allows for the derivation of an analogue of Stone’s theorem for the
orthomodular setting. However, we have not yet addressed the problem of how we can assign
truth values to the newly formalised physical propositions in a coherent way.
4.5 Presheaf Topoi over Posets
We briefly recall some basic definitions from topos theory [21, 2, 17], in particular that of a
subobject classifier. We then specialise to presheaf topoi and further to presheaf topoi over
posets and consider the subobject classifier and truth values in such a topos.
In the following, let 1 denote the terminal object in a category (if it exists).
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Definition 13. In a category C with finite limits, a subobject classifier is a monic, true : 1→ Ω,
such that to every monic S → X in C there is a unique arrow χ which, with the given monic,
forms a pullback square
S
! - 1
X
?
∩
χ
- Ω.
true
?
∩
This means that in a category with subobject classifier, every monic is the pullback of the
special monic true. In a slight abuse of language, we will often call the object Ω the subobject
classifier. In Set, we have Ω = {0, 1}.
Definition 14. An elementary topos is a category E with the following properties:
• E has all finite limits and colimits;
• E has exponentials;
• E has a subobject classifier.
The structural similarity with the category Set of sets and functions – which is itself a
topos, of course – should be obvious. Some further examples of topoi are:
(1) Set× Set, the category of all pairs of sets, with morphisms pairs of functions;
(2) Set2, where 2 = • −→ •. Objects are all functions from one set X to another set Y ,
with commutative squares as arrows;
(3) BG, the category ofG-sets: objects are sets with a right (or left) action byG, and arrows
are G-equivariant functions;
(4) SetC
op
, where C is a small category. This functor category has functors Cop → Set
as objects (also called presheaves over C) and natural transformations between them as
arrows. In fact, all the examples so far are functor categories.
(5) The category Sh(X) of sheaves over a topological space X .
We will now specialise to presheaf topoi, i.e., topoi of the form SetC
op
, where C is a small
category. The terminal object 1 in SetC
op
is given by the presheaf that assigns the one-element
set 1C = {∗} to every object C in C and the constant function {∗} → {∗} to every morphism
in C.
It is a standard result (see e.g. [21]) that the subobject classifier Ω in a presheaf topos is
given by the presheaf of sieves, which we now define. First, let C be an object in C. A sieve on
C is a collection σ of arrows with codomain C such that if (f : B → C) ∈ σ and g : A→ B
is any other arrow in C, then f ◦ g : A→ C is in σ, too.
If h : C → D is an arrow in C and σ is a sieve on D, then σ · h = {f | h ◦ f ∈ σ} is a
sieve on C, the pullback of σ along h.
Definition 15. The presheaf of sieves is given
(a) on objects: for all C ∈ Ob(C), Ω(C) = {σ | σ sieve on C};
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(b) on arrows: for all (h : C → D) ∈ Arr(C), the mapping Ω(h) : Ω(D)→ Ω(C) is given
by the pullback along h.
Clearly, this is an object in the topos SetC
op
. The arrow true : 1→ Ω is given by
∀C ∈ Ob(C) : trueC : 1C −→ ΩC
∗ 7−→ σm(C),
where σm(C) denotes the maximal sieve on C, i.e., the collection of all morphisms in C with
codomain C.
Each topos, and in particular each presheaf topos, comes equipped with an internal, higher-
order intuitionistic logic. This logic is multi-valued in general, and the truth values form a
partially ordered set. In fact, the truth values in a topos are given by the global elements of the
subobject classifier Ω, i.e., by morphisms
1 −→ Ω
from the terminal object 1 to the subobject classifier Ω. Clearly, the arrow true : 1 → Ω
represents one such truth value, and it is interpreted as ‘totally true’. In a presheaf topos
SetC
op
, there also is an arrow false : 1→ Ω, which assigns the empty sieve to each 1C = {∗},
C ∈ Ob(C). The arrow false represents the truth value ‘totally false’. In general, there exist
other morphisms from 1 to Ω, representing truth values between ‘totally true’ and ‘totally
false’.
We now specialise further to presheaf topoi for which the base category C is a (small)
poset.18
Recall that a sieve on an object C is a collection of morphisms with codomain C that is
‘downward closed’ under composition. In a poset, an arrow B → C with codomain C means
that B ≤ C, and if A → B is another arrow in the poset category C (i.e., if A ≤ B), then
the composite arrow A→ C is also contained in the sieve. Keeping the codomain C fixed, an
arrow in the poset category C of the form B˜ → C can be identified with its domain B˜. This
means that in a poset C, a sieve σ on C can be identified with a lower set (or downward closed
set) in ↓ C = {B˜ ∈ C | B˜ ≤ C}, the downset of C. The maximal sieve on C is simply ↓ C.
If C → D is an arrow in C (i.e., if C ≤ D) and σ is a sieve on D, then the pullback of σ
along the arrow C → D is simply the lower set in ↓ C given by σ ∩ ↓ C, as can be checked
by inserting into the definition.
We saw that the truth values in a presheaf topos SetC
op
are given by the arrows of the form
v : 1 → Ω. Since C now is a poset by assumption, the sieve vC is a lower set in ↓ C, and
whenever C ≤ D, then vC = vD ∩ ↓ C. This means that, overall, the arrow v : 1 → Ω
defines a lower set in C. We have shown:
Lemma 11. In a presheaf topos SetC
op
over a poset C, the truth values are given by lower
sets in the poset C.
4.6 The Topos SetBc(P(H))
op
, States and Truth Values
For simplicity, and in order to make closer contact with the usual Hilbert space formalism
again, we assume L = P(H) in this subsection, where P(H) is the projection lattice on a Hil-
bert space H of dimension 3 or greater. We now show how to employ the topos of presheaves
18Regarding the poset C as a category, there is an arrow B → C if and only if B ≤ C. Hence, in a poset there is at
most one arrow from any object B to any object C.
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over Bc(P(H)), the poset of complete Boolean subalgebras of P(H), and its internal logic to
assign truth values to propositions.
Let |ψ〉 ∈ H be a unit vector, representing a pure state of B(H). We apply daseinisation
to the rank-1 projection Pψ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| and obtain a clopen subobject of ΣP(H), the spectral
presheaf of the complete OML P(H). This subobject is denoted as
wψ := δ(Pψ)
and is called the pseudostate corresponding to |ψ〉. While the spectral presheaf ΣP(H) has no
global sections, a fact that is equivalent to the Kochen-Specker theorem [16, 8], ΣP(H) still has
plenty of subobjects, and just like a point in the state space of a classical system represents a
(pure) state, here the pseudostate wψ represents the pure quantum state.
In classical physics, truth values of propositions arise in a simple manner: let S ⊂ S be
a (Borel) subset of the state space S of the classical system. S represents some proposition,
e.g. if fA : S → R is the Borel function representing a physical quantity A of the system,
and ∆ ⊂ R is a Borel subset of the real line, then S = f−1A (∆) is the representative of
the proposition “the physical quantity A has a value in the Borel set ∆”. A (pure) state is
represented by a point p ∈ S. The truth value of the proposition represented by S in the state
represented by p is
‖S‖p = true if p ∈ S and
‖S‖p = false if p /∈ S.
Note that this is equivalent to
‖S‖p = (p ∈ S)
if we read the right-hand side as a set-theoretic proposition that is either true or false. Analo-
gously, let S ∈ Subcl(ΣL) be a clopen subobject that represents a proposition about a quantum
system. Then the truth value of the proposition represented by S in the state represented by
wψ is
‖S‖wψ = (wψ ⊆ S).
Here, the right-hand side must be interpreted as a ‘set-theoretic’ proposition in the topos
SetBc(P(H))
op
of presheaves over Bc(P(H)). This is done using the Mitchell-Benabou lan-
guage of the topos. In our case, where the base category Bc(P(H)) is simply a poset, and
SetBc(P(H))
op
is a presheaf topos, this boils down to something straightforward: for every
context B ∈ Bc(P(H)), we consider the set-theoretic expression
wψB ⊆ SB
‘locally’ at B, which can be either true or false. We collect all those B ∈ Bc(P(H)) for
which the expression wψB ⊆ SB is true. It is easy to see that in this way we obtain a lower set
in Bc(P(H)). As we saw in the previous subsection, such a lower set in the poset Bc(P(H)),
which is the base category of the presheaf topos SetBc(P(H))
op
, can be identified with a global
section of the presheaf of sieves on Bc(P(H)), and hence with a truth value in the (multi-
valued logic provided by the) topos SetBc(P(H))
op
. Hence, we showed how to determine the
truth value ‖S‖wψ of the proposition represented by S in the state represented by wψ.
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There is no obstacle to assigning these truth values in a coherent, non-contextual and
structure-preserving way. The Kochen-Specker theorem is not violated, of course: it is a result
that applies specifically to the representation of physical propositions as projection operators
and truth values as elements of the two-element Boolean algebra. The KS theorem simply
does not apply to the reformulated propositions and truth values of TQT, and so it is perfectly
possible to simultaneously assign truth values to all physical propositions in TQT.19
At this stage, we have sketched the basic formal and conceptual ideas behind QST and
TQT. Both approaches offer new Q-worlds in which we can hope to reformulate QM in a
conceptually illuminating way. However, beyond this superficial analogy, it is not obvious that
there is any deep connection between the two projects. In the next section, we will explore
the relationship between the distributive logic of TQT and traditional orthomodular quantum
logic. This will subsequently allow us to establish rich and interesting connections between
TQT and QST in section 6.
5 Paraconsistency and Distributivity in Quantum Lo-
gic
5.1 Paraconsistent Negation
It is interesting to note that theorem 10 establishes that E and L are isomorphic as complete
lattices, but says nothing about the negation operations defined on E and L. In section 6, it
will be important for our purposes that the isomorphism between E and L preserves negations
as well as the lattice structure. There is an obvious way of defining a negation operation on E
that allows us to extend the isomorphism from theorem 10 to include negations. Specifically,
Eva [10] suggests the following definition.
Definition 16. Given S ∈ Subcl(Σ), define S∗ = δ(ε(S)⊥), i.e. S∗ is the daseinisation of the
orthocomplement of ε(S) (where ⊥ denotes the orthocomplement of L).
The idea is that S∗ is obtained by translating S into an element of L via ε, negating that
element by L’s classical orthocomplementation operation, and then translating the negated
element back into a clopen subobject via δ. Eva [10] notes that defining [S]∗ = [S∗] implies
that E and L are isomorphic not just as complete lattices, but also as complete ortholattices.
So we can extend the correspondence to cover the full logical structure of E. This fact will
turn out to be important in our attempts to obtain a connection between TQT and QST.
However, the negation operation ∗ that we used to extend this isomorphism turns out to
have some unexpected properties. Most importantly, ∗ is paraconsistent. To see this, recall
that for any S, δ(ε(S)) ≤ S. This means that
S ∧ S∗ = S ∧ δ(ε(S)⊥) ≥ δ(ε(S)) ∧ δ(ε(S)⊥) ≥ δ(ε(S) ∧ ε(S)⊥) = ⊥.
These inequalities can all be strict, so S ∧ S∗ will not generally be minimal, i.e. the ∗
operation is paraconsistent. So the natural ‘translation’ of the orthocomplement of an ortho-
modular lattice into the distributive setting is inherently paraconsistent. Eva [10] establishes
the following basic properties of the ∗ negation.
Theorem 12. The ∗ operation has the following properties:
19For further discussion of the philosophical interpretation of the truth values in TQT, see Eva [11].
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(i) S ∨ S∗ = >,
(ii) S∗∗ = δ(ε(S)) ≤ S,
(iii) S∗∗∗ = S∗,
(iv) S ∧ S∗ ≥ ⊥,
(v)
∨
j S
∗
j = (
∧
j Sj)
∗ for any family {Sj} ⊆ Subcl(Σ),
(vi)
∧
j S
∗
j ≥ (
∨
j Sj)
∗ for any family {Sj} ⊆ Subcl(Σ),
(vii) ε(S) ∨ ε(S∗) = >,
(viii) ε(S) ∧ ε(S∗) = ⊥,
(ix) S ≤ T implies S∗ ≥ T ∗, i.e. ∗ is an involution.
Note that before we defined ∗, Subcl(Σ), as a complete bi-Heyting algebra, was already
equipped with a canonical intuitionistic negation operation and a canonical paraconsistent ne-
gation operation. However, these negations cannot be included in the isomorphism between
E and L, which motivates the study of ∗ as an independent negation operation on Subcl(Σ).20
It is important to note that the Heyting implication operation ⇒ will not interact in any nice
way with ∗. In order to establish a connection between TQT and QST, we will need to define
implication operations on Subcl(Σ) that are compatible with ∗. Before doing this, it is useful
to prove a couple of lemmas.
From now on, we will stop underlining presheaves to improve readability.
Lemma 13. ε(S∗) = ε(S)⊥, for any S ∈ Subcl(Σ).
Proof. ε(S∗) = ε(δ(ε(S)⊥)) = ε(S)⊥.
Lemma 14. δ(a)∗ = δ(a⊥), for any a ∈ P(H).
Proof. δ(a)∗ = δ(ε(δ(a))⊥) = δ(a⊥).
Lemma 15. δ(a)∗∗ = δ(a), for any a ∈ P(H), i.e. the image of δ is ‘∗-regular’.
Proof. δ(a)∗∗ = δ(a⊥)∗ = δ(a⊥⊥) = δ(a).
Lemma 16. δ(ε(S)) is the smallest member of the equivalence class [S] of S under the ε
equivalence relation, and S∗∗ = δ(ε(S)) for all S.
Proof. Let T ∈ [S], then ε(T ) = ε(S). So δ(ε(S)) = δ(ε(T )) ≤ T . Since T was arbitrary,
this proves the first part of the lemma. Moreover, we have
S∗∗ = δ(ε(S∗)⊥) = δ(ε(S)⊥⊥) = δ(ε(S)).
We are now ready to translate the three quantum material implication operations into the
distributive setting. We say that an implication operation ⇒ on Subcl(Σ) ‘mirrors’ a corre-
sponding operation → on L if and only if for any S, T ∈ Subcl(Σ) and for any a, b ∈ L,
δ(a→ b) = δ(a)⇒ δ(b) and ε(S ⇒ T ) = ε(S)→ ε(T ).
20Note that Subcl(Σ), equipped with ∗, is still distributive since we assume the same lattice operations as before.
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Theorem 17. The operation⇒S on Subcl(Σ) defined by S ⇒S T := S∗∨(S∗∨T ∗)∗ mirrors
the Sasaki conditional→S on P(H).
Proof. The assertion follows from the calculations shown below.
δ(a→S b) = δ(a⊥ ∨ (a ∧ b)) = δ(a⊥) ∨ δ(a ∧ b) = δ(a)∗ ∨ δ(a ∧ b)
= δ(a)∗ ∨ δ(a ∧ b)∗∗ = δ(a)∗ ∨ δ((a ∧ b)⊥)∗
= δ(a)∗ ∨ δ(a⊥ ∨ b⊥)∗ = δ(a)∗ ∨ (δ(a⊥) ∨ δ(b⊥))∗
= δ(a)∗ ∨ (δ(a)∗ ∨ δ(b)∗)∗
= δ(a)⇒S δ(b).
ε(S ⇒S T ) = ε(S∗ ∨ (S∗ ∨ T ∗)∗) = ε((S ∧ (S∗ ∨ T ∗))∗)
= ε(S ∧ (S∗ ∨ T ∗))⊥ = (ε(S) ∧ ε(S∗ ∨ T ∗))⊥
= ε(S)⊥ ∨ ε(S∗ ∨ T ∗)⊥ = ε(S)⊥ ∨ ε((S ∧ T )∗)⊥
= ε(S)⊥ ∨ ε(S ∧ T )⊥⊥ = ε(S)⊥ ∨ ε(S ∧ T )
= ε(S)→S ε(T ).
Theorem 18. The operation⇒C on Subcl(Σ) defined by S ⇒C T := T ∗ ⇒S S∗ mirrors the
contrapositive Sasaki conditional→C on P(H).
Proof. The assertion follows from the calculations shown below.
δ(a→C b) = δ(b⊥ →S a⊥) = δ(b⊥)⇒S δ(a⊥) = δ(b)∗ ⇒S δ(a)∗
= δ(a)⇒C δ(b).
ε(S ⇒C T ) = ε(T ∗ ⇒S S∗) = ε(T ∗)→S ε(S∗) = ε(T )⊥ →S ε(S)⊥
= ε(S)→C ε(T ).
Theorem 19. The operation⇒R on Subcl(Σ) defined by S ⇒R T := ((S ⇒S T ) ∧ (S ⇒C
T ))∗∗ mirrors the relevance conditional→R on P(H).
Proof. The assertion follows from the calculations shown below.
δ(a→R b) = δ((a→S b) ∧ (a→C b)) = δ((a→S b) ∧ (a→C b))∗∗
= δ((a→S b)⊥ ∨ (a→C b)⊥)∗ = (δ((a→S b)⊥) ∨ δ((a→C b)⊥))∗
= (δ(a→S b)∗ ∨ δ(a→C b)∗)∗ = (δ(a→S b) ∧ δ(a→C b))∗∗
= ((δ(a)⇒S δ(b)) ∧ (δ(a)⇒C δ(b)))∗∗
= δ(a)⇒R δ(b).
ε(S ⇒R T ) = ε(((S ⇒S T ) ∧ (S ⇒C T ))∗∗) = ε((S ⇒S T ) ∧ (S ⇒C T ))⊥⊥
= ε((S ⇒S T ) ∧ (S ⇒C T )) = ε(S ⇒S T ) ∧ ε(S ⇒C T )
= (ε(S)→S ε(T )) ∧ (ε(S)→C ε(T ))
= ε(S)→R ε(T ).
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We have successfully translated the three quantum material implication operations into cor-
responding operations on the distributive lattice of clopen subobjects of the spectral presheaf
equipped with the paraconsistent negation ∗. Of course, the induced implications on Subcl(Σ)
will have different logical properties to their orthomodular counterparts. For example, they will
generally violate modus ponens. This is not surprising given that modus ponens is a proble-
matic inference rule for paraconsistent logics in general (for instance, it is known that modus
ponens fails in Priest’s [23] paraconsistent ‘logic of paradox’). At any rate, we can show that
all three implication operations share some basic structural properties.
Proposition 20. For j = S,C,R,⇒j satisfies the following properties:
(i) > ⇒j S = S∗∗,
(ii) ⊥ ⇒j S = >,
(iii) S ⇒j > = >,
(iv) S ⇒j ⊥ = S∗,
(v) S ⇒j T = > if and only if S∗∗ ≤ T ∗∗.
Proof. (i)–(iv) follow from the following calculations.
> ⇒j S = δ(ε(>)→j ε(S)) = δ(> →j ε(S)) = δ(ε(S)) = S∗∗,
⊥ ⇒j S = δ(ε(⊥)→j ε(S)) = δ(⊥ →j ε(S)) = δ(>) = >,
S ⇒j > = δ(ε(S)→j ε(>)) = δ(ε(S)→j >) = δ(ε(S)⊥ ∨ >) = δ(>) = >,
S ⇒j ⊥ = δ(ε(S)→j ε(⊥)) = δ(ε(S)→j ⊥) = δ(ε(S)⊥ ∨ ⊥) = δ(ε(S)⊥) = S∗.
To prove (v), suppose S ⇒j T = >. Then ε(S)→j ε(T ) = ε(S ⇒j T ) = ε(>) = >, so
ε(S) ≤ ε(T ), and hence S∗∗ = δ(ε(S)) ≤ δ(ε(T )) = T ∗∗. Conversely, suppose S∗∗ ≤ T ∗∗.
Then, ε(S) = ε(S∗∗) ≤ ε(T ∗∗) = ε(T ), so that ε(S ⇒j T ) = ε(S) →j ε(T ) = >, and
hence S ⇒j T ≥ (S ⇒j T )∗∗ = δ(ε(S ⇒j T )) = >. Therefore, we have S ⇒j T = >.
5.2 Commutativity and Paraconsistency
Since if an orthomodular lattice is distributive, it is a Boolean algebra and it represents a
classical logic, it is often considered that a distributive lattice represents a sublogic of the
classical logic or a logic of simultaneously determinate (or commuting) propositions. However,
this idea may conflicts with our embedding of an orthomodular lattice P(H), a typical logic
for simultaneously indeterminate (or noncommuting) propositions, into a distributive lattice
Subcl(Σ). In order to resolve this conflict, we introduce the notion of commutativity using the
paraconsistent negation, and show that noncommutativity can be be expressed in a distributive
logic with paraconsistent negation. Thus, without specifying what negation is considered with
it, it may not be answered whether a distributive lattice represents a classical logic.
Definition 17. Given S, T ∈ Subcl(Σ), we say that S commutes with T (in symbols S |◦ T ) if
ε(S) commutes with ε(T ) in P(H), i.e., ε(S) = (ε(S) ∧ ε(T )) ∨ (ε(S) ∧ ε(T )⊥).
Proposition 21. For any a, b ∈ P(H), we have a |◦ b if and only if δ(a) |◦ δ(b).
Proof. Since δ(a), δ(b) ∈ Subcl(Σ), we have δ(a) |◦ δ(b) if and only if ε(δ(a)) |◦ ε(δ(b)) if and
only if a |◦ b.
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The following theorem shows that the commutativity can be expressed only by lattice ope-
rations and the paraconsistent negation ∗.
Theorem 22. For any S, T ∈ Subcl(Σ), we have S |◦ T if and only if
S∗∗ = (S∗ ∨ (T ∗ ∧ T ∗∗))∗. (1)
Proof. Let S, T ∈ Subcl(Σ) and let f(S, T ) = (ε(S) ∧ ε(T )) ∨ (ε(S) ∧ ε(T )⊥). We have
δ ◦ f(S, T ) = δ(ε(S) ∧ ε(T )) ∨ δ(ε(S) ∧ ε(T )⊥)
= δ ◦ ε(S ∧ T ) ∨ δ ◦ ε(S ∧ T ∗)
= (S ∧ T )∗∗ ∨ (S ∧ T ∗)∗∗
= (S∗ ∨ T ∗)∗ ∨ (S∗ ∨ T ∗∗)∗
= ((S∗ ∨ T ∗) ∧ (S∗ ∨ T ∗∗))∗
= (S∗ ∨ (T ∗ ∧ T ∗∗))∗.
Suppose S |◦ T . Then, we have δ ◦ f(S, T ) = δ ◦ ε(S) = S∗∗, and we obtain relation (1).
Conversely, suppose that relation (1) holds. Then, we have δ ◦ f(S, T ) = S∗∗ = δ ◦ ε(S) and
hence we have f(S, T ) = ε ◦ δ ◦ f(S, T ) = ε ◦ δ ◦ ε(S) = ε(S), so that S |◦ T holds.
The following theorems show that the the distributive logic Subcl(Σ) with the negation ∗
is properly paraconsistent in the sense that S ∧ S∗ = ⊥ only if S = > or S = ⊥ for all
S ∈ Subcl(Σ).
Theorem 23. For any a ∈ P(H), we have δ(a) ∧ δ(a)∗ = ⊥ if and only if a = > or a = ⊥.
Proof. It is obvious that δ(a) ∧ δ(a)∗ = ⊥ if a = > or a = ⊥. Suppose δ(a) ∧ δ(a)∗ = ⊥.
Let x ∈ P(H). Then we have
(δ(x)∗ ∨ (δ(a)∗ ∧ δ(a)∗∗))∗ = (δ(x)∗ ∨ (δ(a)∗ ∧ δ(a)))∗ = δ(x)∗∗.
Thus, δ(a) |◦ δ(x) so that a |◦ x by Proposition 21. It follows that a |◦ x for all x ∈ P(H), and
hence a = > or a = ⊥.
Theorem 24. For any S ∈ Subcl(Σ), we have S ∧ S∗ = ⊥ if and only if S = > or S = ⊥.
Proof. It is obvious that S ∧ S∗ = ⊥ if S = > or S = ⊥. Suppose that S ∧ S∗ = ⊥. Since
S∗∗ ≤ S, we have S∗∗ ∧ S∗ = ⊥. Since S∗∗ = δ(ε(S)) = δ(a), where a = ε(S), we have
S∗ = S∗∗∗ = δ(a)∗, so S∗∗ ∧ S∗ = δ(a) ∧ δ(a)∗ = ⊥. By Theorem 23, a = ⊥ or a = >,
so S∗∗ = δ(a) = ⊥ or S∗∗ = >. If S∗∗ = >, then S = > since S∗∗ ≤ S. If S∗∗ = ⊥, then
S∗ = S∗∗∗ = >, so that S = S ∧ S∗ = ⊥. Thus, if S ∧ S∗ = ⊥ then S = > or S = ⊥.
The idea now is to study the logical structure of Subcl(Σ) equipped with the paraconsistent
negation ∗ and the translated orthomodular implications⇒S , ⇒C , ⇒R (it turns out that⇒S
has a special role here). As we will see in the next section, this new logical structure allows us
to develop rich new connections between TQT and QST.
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6 Bridging the Gap
6.1 V (Subcl(Σ))
Eva [10] suggests the possibility of connecting TQT and QST via the set-theoretic structure
V (Subcl(Σ)), where Subcl(Σ) is equipped with the negation ∗ rather than the Heyting negation.
However, he stops short of translating the orthomodular implication connectives into the dis-
tributive setting and does not provide any characterisation of the extent to which V (Subcl(Σ)) is
able to model any interesting mathematics.
Definition 18. For j = S,C,R, we define the Subcl(Σ)-valued truth value [[φ]]j of any formula
φ in the language of set theory augmented by the names of elements of V (Subcl(Σ)) by the
following rules recursive on the rank of elements of V (Subcl(Σ)) and the complexity of formulas.
(i) [[φ1 ∧ φ2]]j = [[φ1]]j ∧ [[φ2]]j .
(ii) [[φ1 ∨ φ2]]j = [[φ1]]j ∨ [[φ2]]j .
(iii) [[¬φ]]j = [[φ]]∗j .
(iv) [[φ1 → φ2]]j = [[φ1]]j ⇒j [[φ2]]j .
(v) [[∀xφ(x)]]j =
∧
u′∈V (Subcl(Σ)) [[φ(u
′)]]j .
(vi) [[∃xφ(x)]]j =
∨
u′∈V (Subcl(Σ)) [[φ(u
′)]]j .
(vii) [[∀x ∈ uφ(x)]]j =
∧
u′∈dom(u) u(u
′)⇒j [[φ(u′)]]j .
(viii) [[∃x ∈ uφ(x)]]j =
∨
u′∈dom(u) u(u
′) ∧ [[φ(u′)]]j .
(ix) [[x = y]]j = [[∀x′ ∈ x(x′ ∈ y)]]j ∧ [[∀y′ ∈ y(y′ ∈ x)]]j .
(x) [[x ∈ y]]j = [[∃y′ ∈ y (x = y′)]]j .
We write V (Subcl(Σ)) |= φ if [[φ]]j = >.
Definition 19. The universe V of the ZFC set theory is embedded into V (Subcl(Σ)) by
ˆ: V → V (Subcl(Σ)),
x 7→ xˆ,
where xˆ = {〈yˆ,>〉 | y ∈ x}, i.e. dom(x) = {yˆ | y ∈ x} and xˆ assigns the value > to every
element of its domain.
This embedding satisfies the following properties.
Proposition 25. The following relations hold for any u, v ∈ V .
(i) [[uˆ ∈ vˆ]]j = > if u ∈ v.
(ii) [[uˆ ∈ vˆ]]j = ⊥ if u 6∈ v.
(iii) [[uˆ = vˆ]]j = > if u = v.
(iv) [[uˆ = vˆ]]j = ⊥ if u 6= v.
Proof. Let u, v ∈ V (Subcl(Σ)). Suppose that relations (iii) and (iv) hold for any u′ ∈ dom(u)
and v′ ∈ dom(v).
[[uˆ′ ∈ vˆ]]j =
∨
v′∈dom(v)
v(v′) ∧ [[uˆ′ = v′]]j =
∨
v′∈v
v(vˆ′) ∧ [[uˆ′ = vˆ′]]j =
∨
v′∈v
[[uˆ′ = vˆ′]]j ,
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[[uˆ = vˆ]]j =
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)⇒j [[u′ ∈ v]]j ∧
∧
v′∈dom(v)
v(v′)⇒j [[v′ ∈ u]]j .
=
∧
u′∈u
u(uˆ′)⇒j [[uˆ′ ∈ v]]j ∧
∧
v′∈v
v(vˆ′)⇒j [[vˆ′ ∈ u]]j .
=
∧
u′∈u
[[uˆ′ ∈ vˆ]]∗∗j ∧
∧
v′∈v
[[vˆ′ ∈ uˆ]]∗∗j
=
∧
u′∈u
(
∨
v′∈v
[[uˆ′ = vˆ′]]j)∗∗ ∧
∧
v′∈v
(
∨
u′∈u
[[vˆ′ = uˆ′]]j)∗∗
Thus, [[uˆ = vˆ]]j = > if u = v, and [[uˆ = vˆ]]j = ⊥ if u 6= v for all u, v ∈ V (Subcl(Σ)).
Consequently, relations (iii) and (iv) have been proved by induction. Then, relations (i) and
(ii) follow straightforwardly.
Corollary 26. The following statements hold.
(1) Given a ∆0-formula φ with n free variables, and x1, ..., xn ∈ V , φ(x1, ..., xn) ↔
V (Subcl(Σ)) |= φ(xˆ1, ..., xˆn).
(2) Given a Σ1-formula φ with n free variables, and x1, ..., xn ∈ V , φ(x1, ..., xn) →
V (Subcl(Σ)) |= φ(xˆ1, ..., xˆn).
The first thing to note is that, assuming ∗, V (Subcl(Σ)) is a set-theoretic structure with a
paraconsistent internal logic. In recent years, Weber [33, 34], Brady [4], Lo¨we and Tarafder
[19] and others have done exciting work in exploring the possibility of developing a non-trivial
set theory built over a paraconsistent logic. However, there is still no well established model
theory for paraconsistent set theory, despite some promising recent developments (see e.g.
Libert [18], Lo¨we and Tarafder [19]). So it is not currently possible to characterise V (Subcl(Σ))
as a full model of any particular set theory. However, we will now show that it is possible to
translate Ozawa’s ∆0 transfer principle for orthomodular valued models to the paraconsistent
structure V (Subcl(Σ)). This guarantees that V (Subcl(Σ)) is able to model significant fragments
of classical mathematics. The following definition will play an important role.
Definition 20. The maps α : V (P(H)) → V (Subcl(Σ)) and ω : V (Subcl(Σ)) → V (P(H)) are
given by the following recursive definitions:
(i) Given u ∈ V (P(H)), α(u) = {〈α(x), δ(u(x))〉|x ∈ dom(u)}.
(ii) Given u ∈ V (Subcl(Σ)), ω(u) = {〈ω(x), ε(u(x))〉|x ∈ dom(u)}.
From now on, we will write uP(H)/ucl if it’s necessary to clarify whether u is defined in
V (P(H)) or V (Subcl(Σ)).
Intuitively, α is an embedding of the orthomodular valued structure V (P(H)) into the pa-
raconsistent and distributive structure V (Subcl(Σ)). It allows us to translate the constructions
of QST into a new setting whose logic is closely connected to TQT. α and ω can be seen as
‘higher level’ versions of the morphisms δ, ε that map between whole Q-worlds rather than
simple lattices.
Before proving a fundamental theorem concerning the implications of α, recall the in-
duction principle for algebraic valued models of set theory, which says that for any algebra
A,
∀u ∈ V (A)((∀u′ ∈ dom(u)φ(u′)→ φ(u))→ ∀u ∈ V (A)φ(u)),
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i.e. if we want to prove that φ holds for every element of the structure V (A), it is sufficient to
show that for arbitrary u ∈ V (A), φ holding for everything in u’s domain implies that φ holds
for u. We use this inductive principle in the proof of the following key result. In the following,
a ‘negation-free ∆0-formula’ is any formula constructed from atomic formulae of the form
x = y or x ∈ y by adding conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, and bounded quantifiers (∀x ∈ y) and
(∃x ∈ y), where x and y denote arbitrary variables.
Theorem 27. For any negation-free ∆0-formula φ(x1, ..., xn) and any u1, ..., un ∈ V (P(H)),
δ(‖φ(u1, ..., un)‖S) ≤ ‖φ(α(u1), ..., α(un))‖S .
Proof. In the proof, we omit the symbol S and simply assume that ⇒ always denotes ⇒S .
Argue by induction. Let u ∈ V (P(H)) and suppose that ∀u′ ∈ dom(u), ∀v ∈ V (P(H)), we
have
(i) ‖α(u′) = α(v)‖ ≥ δ(‖u′ = v‖),
(ii) ‖α(u′) ∈ α(v)‖ ≥ δ(‖u′ ∈ v‖),
(iii) ‖α(v) ∈ α(u′)‖ ≥ δ(‖v ∈ u′‖).
Let v ∈ V (P(H)). Using the easily observed fact that b ≤ c implies a⇒S b ≤ a⇒S c and
the induction hypotheses, we have
‖α(u) = α(v)‖
=
∧
u′∈dom(u)
α(u)(α(u′))⇒ ‖α(u′) ∈ α(v)‖ ∧
∧
v′∈dom(v)
α(v)(α(v′))⇒ ‖α(v′) ∈ α(u)‖
=
∧
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′))⇒ ‖α(u′) ∈ α(v)‖ ∧
∧
v′∈dom(v)
δ(v(v′))⇒ ‖α(v′) ∈ α(u)‖
≥
∧
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′))⇒ δ(‖u′ ∈ v‖) ∧
∧
v′∈dom(v)
δ(v(v′))⇒ ‖α(v′) ∈ α(u)‖
=
∧
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v‖) ∧
∧
v′∈dom(v)
δ(v(v′))⇒ ‖α(v′) ∈ α(u)‖
≥ δ(
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v‖) ∧
∧
v′∈dom(v)
δ(v(v′))⇒ ‖α(v′) ∈ α(u)‖.
So we have
(∗) ‖α(u) = α(v)‖ ≥ δ(∧u′∈dom(u) u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v‖)∧∧v′∈dom(v) δ(v(v′))⇒ ‖α(v′) ∈
α(u)‖
Now, we know that
‖α(v′) ∈ α(u)‖ =
∨
u′∈dom(u)
α(u)(α(u′)) ∧ ‖α(v′) = α(u′)‖
=
∨
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′)) ∧ ‖α(v′) = α(u′)‖
≥
∨
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′)) ∧ δ(‖u′ = v′‖)
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≥
∨
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′) ∧ ‖u′ = v′‖)
= δ(
∨
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′) ∧ ‖u′ = v′‖)
= δ(‖v′ ∈ u‖).
Combined with (∗), this gives us
‖α(u) = α(v)‖ ≥ δ(
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v‖) ∧
∧
v′∈dom(v)
δ(v(v′))⇒ δ(‖v′ ∈ u‖)
= δ(
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v‖) ∧
∧
v′∈dom(v)
δ(v(v′)→ ‖v′ ∈ u‖)
≥ δ(
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v‖) ∧ δ(
∧
v′∈dom(v)
v(v′)→ ‖v′ ∈ u‖)
≥ δ(
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v‖ ∧
∧
v′∈dom(v)
v(v′)→ ‖v′ ∈ u‖)
= δ(‖u = v‖).
i.e. ‖α(u) = α(v)‖ ≥ δ(‖u = v‖). We also have that
‖α(v) ∈ α(u)‖ =
∨
u′∈dom(u)
α(u)(α(u′)) ∧ ‖α(v) = α(u′)‖
=
∨
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′)) ∧ ‖α(v) = α(u′)‖
≥
∨
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′)) ∧ δ(‖v = u′‖)
≥
∨
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′) ∧ ‖v = u′‖)
= δ(
∨
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′) ∧ ‖v = u′‖)
= δ(‖v ∈ u‖).
i.e. ‖α(v) ∈ α(u)‖ ≥ δ(‖v ∈ u‖). It remains to show that ‖α(u) ∈ α(v)‖ ≥ δ(‖u ∈ v‖).
‖α(u) ∈ α(v)‖ =
∨
v′∈dom(v)
α(v)(α(v′)) ∧ ‖α(u) = α(v′)‖
=
∨
v′∈dom(v)
δ(v(v′)) ∧ ‖α(u) = α(v′)‖.
Now, we know that
‖α(u) = α(v′)‖ =
∧
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′))⇒ ‖α(u′) ∈ α(v′)‖ ∧
∧
z∈dom(v′)
δ(v′(z))⇒ ‖α(z) ∈ α(u)‖
≥ δ(
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v′‖) ∧
∧
z∈dom(v′)
δ(v′(z))⇒ ‖α(z) ∈ α(u)‖.
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Furthermore, ‖α(z) ∈ α(u)‖ ≥ δ(‖z ∈ u‖) (by the same argument that showed ‖α(v) ∈
α(u)‖ ≥ δ(‖v ∈ u‖)), which implies that
‖α(u) = α(v′)‖ ≥ δ(
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v′‖) ∧
∧
z∈dom(v′)
δ(v′(z))⇒ δ(‖z ∈ u)‖)
≥ δ(
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)→ ‖u′ ∈ v′‖ ∧
∧
z∈dom(v′)
v′(z)→ ‖z ∈ u‖)
= δ(‖u = v′‖)
This in turn implies that
‖α(u) ∈ α(v)‖ ≥
∨
v′∈dom(v)
δ(v(v′)) ∧ δ(‖u = v′‖)
≥ δ(
∨
v′∈dom(v)
v(v′) ∧ ‖u = v′‖)
= δ(‖u ∈ v‖).
Thus, the assertion holds for all atomic formulae.
Suppose that negation-free ∆0-formulae φj(~x) for j = 1, 2 satisfy
δ(‖φj(~u)‖) ≤ ‖φj(α(~u)))‖
for any u1, . . . , un ∈ V (P(H)), where ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), ~u = (u1, . . . , un), and α(~u) =
(α(u1), . . . , α(un)). Then we have
‖φ1(α(~u)) ∧ φ2(α(~u))‖ = ‖φ1(α(~u))‖ ∧ ‖φ2(α(~u))‖
≥ δ(‖φ1(~u)‖) ∧ δ(‖φ2(~u)‖)
≥ δ(‖φ1(~u)‖ ∧ ‖φ2(~u)‖)
= δ(‖φ1(~u) ∧ φ2(~u)‖).
We also have
‖φ1(α(~u)) ∨ φ2(α(~u))‖ = ‖φ1(α(~u))‖ ∨ ‖φ2(α(~u))‖
≥ δ(‖φ1(~u)‖) ∨ δ(‖φ2(~u)‖)
= δ(‖φ1(~u)‖ ∨ ‖φ2(~u)‖)
= δ(‖φ1(~u) ∨ φ2(~u)‖).
Suppose that a negation-free ∆0-formula φ(x, ~x) satisfies
δ(‖φ(u, ~u)‖) ≤ ‖φ(α(u), α(~u))‖
for any u, u1, . . . .un ∈ V (P(H)). Then, we have
‖(∀x ∈ α(u))φ(x, α(~u))‖ =
∧
w∈dom(α(u))
α(u)(w)⇒ ‖φ(w,α(~u))‖
=
∧
u′∈dom(u)
α(u)(α(u′))⇒ ‖φ(α(u′), α(~u))‖
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≥
∧
u′∈dom(u)
α(u)(α(u′))⇒ δ(‖φ(u′, ~u)‖)
=
∧
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′))⇒ δ(‖φ(u′, ~u)‖)
≥
∧
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′)→ ‖φ(u′, ~u)‖)
≥ δ(
∧
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′)→ ‖φ(u′, ~u)‖)
≥ δ(‖(∀x ∈ u)φ(x, ~u)‖),
and we also have
‖(∃x ∈ α(u))φ(x, α(~u)‖ =
∨
w∈dom(α(u))
α(u)(w) ∧ ‖φ(w,α(~u)‖
=
∨
u′∈dom(u)
α(u)(α(u′)) ∧ ‖φ(α(u′), α(~u))‖
≥
∨
u′∈dom(u)
α(u)(α(u′)) ∧ δ(‖φ(u′, ~u)‖)
=
∨
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′)) ∧ δ(‖φ(u′, ~u)‖)
≥
∨
u′∈dom(u)
δ(u(u′) ∧ ‖φ(u′, ~u)‖)
= δ(
∨
u′∈dom(u)
u(u′) ∧ ‖φ(u′, ~u)‖)
= δ(‖(∃x ∈ u)φ(x, ~u)‖).
This completes the proof by induction on the complexity of negation-free ∆0-formulae.
Combined with theorem 2 and the monotonicity of δ, theorem 27 immediately leads to the
following important corollary.
Theorem 28. For any negation-free ∆0-formula φ(x1, ..., xn) and any u1, ..., un ∈ V (P(H)),
if φ(x1, ..., xn) is provable in ZFC then
δ(∨(u1, ..., un)) ≤ ‖φ(α(u1), ...α(un))‖S .
Equipped with theorem 28, we can guarantee that V (Subcl(Σ)) will model significant frag-
ments of classical mathematics. Crucially, we can now translate many of Ozawa’s [25] results
characterising the behaviour of the real numbers in orthomodular valued models to the para-
consistent structure V (Subcl(Σ)).21
21It is also worth briefly pointing out that V (Subcl(Σ)) is very clearly a non-trivial structure. It is not the case that
every Subcl(Σ)-sentence is satisfied by V (Subcl(Σ)). To give a simple example, let e ∈ V (Subcl(Σ)) be any element
such that for every x ∈ dom(e), e(x) = ⊥. Then it is easy to see that for any u ∈ V (Subcl(Σ)), ‖u ∈ e‖ = ⊥.
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6.2 Real Numbers in V (Subcl(Σ))
We are now ready to use the paraconsistent structure V (Subcl(Σ)) to establish a rich and po-
werful connection between TQT and QST. First of all, we can define the Dedekind reals in
V (Subcl(Σ)) in the usual way. Eva [10] shows that, in the case where the original orthomodu-
lar lattice is a projection lattice P(H), R(Subcl(Σ)) is closely related to the set SA(H) of all
self-adjoint operators onH.
An operator X is called weakly self-adjoint if it has a real spectrum and a spectral family
(EXq )q∈Q, but the latter does not necessarily have the property
∨
q∈QE
X
q = > (where >
denotes the top element of the projection lattice, i.e. the identity operator). Intuitively, a
weakly self-adjoint operator may have +∞ in its spectrum, with ‘eigenspace’ the subspace
that >−∨q∈QEXq projects onto.
Theorem 29. Let WSA(H) and BSA(H) represent the sets of weakly self-adjoint and boun-
ded self-adjoint operators on a fixed Hilbert space H, respectively, and let R(Subcl(Σ)) denote
the set of all Dedekind reals in V (Subcl(Σ)). Then there exist injections G : R(Subcl(Σ)) →
WSA(H), H : BSA(H)→ R(Subcl(Σ)).
So there exists a close connection between the real numbers in V (Subcl(Σ)) and the physical
quantities associated with the relevant quantum system. Here, we extend this connection and
render it more precisely.
Recall first that R(Subcl(Σ)) is defined by
R(Subcl(Σ)) = {u ∈ V (Subcl(Σ))|dom(u) = dom(Qˆ) ∧ ‖R(u)‖ = >},
where R(u) is the formula
R(u) := ∀y ∈ u(y ∈ Qˆ)∧∃y ∈ Qˆ(y ∈ u) ∧ ∃y ∈ Qˆ(y /∈ u)∧
∀y ∈ Qˆ(y ∈ u↔ ∃z ∈ Qˆ(z < y ∧ z ∈ u)).
Proposition 30. The following relation holds for any u ∈ R(Subcl(Σ)) and r ∈ Q:
‖rˆ ∈ u‖ = u(rˆ).
Proof. The relation follows from
‖rˆ ∈ u‖ = ∨
s∈Q
u(sˆ) ∧ ‖sˆ = rˆ‖ = u(rˆ).
Proposition 31. For any u ∈ V (Subcl(Σ)) with dom(u) = Qˆ, u ∈ R(Subcl(Σ)) if and only if the
following conditions hold:
(i)
∨
r∈Q
u(rˆ) = >
(ii)
∨
r∈Q
u(rˆ)∗ = >
(iii) (
∨
s∈Q:s<r
u(sˆ))∗∗ = u(rˆ)∗∗
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Proof. By definition, u ∈ R(Subcl(Σ)) if and only if ‖R(u)‖ = > if and only if the following
conditions hold:
(P1) ‖∃y ∈ Qˆ(y ∈ u)‖ = >
(P2) ‖∃y ∈ Qˆ(y /∈ u)‖ = >
(P3) ‖∀y ∈ Qˆ[y ∈ u↔ ∃z ∈ Qˆ(z < y ∧ z ∈ u)]‖ = >
We have that
‖∃y ∈ Qˆ(y ∈ u)‖ = ∨
r∈Q
Qˆ(rˆ) ∧ ‖rˆ ∈ u‖ = ∨
r∈Q
‖rˆ ∈ u‖ = ∨
r∈Q
u(rˆ)
‖∃y ∈ Qˆ(y /∈ u)‖ = ∨
r∈Q
Qˆ(rˆ) ∧ ‖rˆ /∈ u‖ = ∨
r∈Q
‖rˆ ∈ u‖∗ = ∨
r∈Q
u(rˆ)∗
Thus, (P1)⇔ (i) and (P2)⇔ (ii). Furthermore,
‖∀y ∈ Qˆ[y ∈ u↔ ∃z ∈ Qˆ(z < y ∧ z ∈ u)]‖ = ∧
r∈Q
(‖rˆ ∈ u‖ ⇔ ∨
s∈Q
(‖sˆ < rˆ‖ ∧ ‖sˆ ∈ u‖))
=
∧
r∈Q
(‖rˆ ∈ u‖ ⇔ ∨
r∈Q:s<r
‖sˆ ∈ u‖) = ∧
r∈Q
(u(rˆ)⇔ ∨
r∈Q:s<r
u(sˆ))
And since S ⇒ T = > if and only if S∗∗ ≤ T ∗∗ (proposition 20 (v)), it follows that (P3)
⇔ (iii), as desired.
Recall that, by the spectral theorem for self-adjoint operators, for any self-adjoint opera-
tor X ∈ SA(H), there corresponds a unique left continuous family of spectral projections
{EXq |q ∈ Q} ⊆ P (H) satisfying the following properties,
(i)
∨
q∈Q
EXq = >,
(ii)
∨
q∈Q:q<r
EXq = E
X
r ,
(iii)
∨
q∈Q
(EXq )
⊥ = >.
Here, property (iii) is a reformulation of the more familiar
∧
q∈QE
X
q = ⊥.
Definition 21. Define the map H : SA(H)→ V (Subcl(Σ)) by dom(H(X)) = Qˆ and
H(X)(qˆ) = δ(EXq ) (∀q ∈ Q).
Intuitively, the map H allows us to represent self-adjoint operators within the structure
V (Subcl(Σ)). Since δ is injective and the correspondence between left continuous spectral fa-
milies and self-adjoint operators is bijective, it follows that H is also injective.
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Proposition 32. For any X ∈ SA(H), the following properties hold.
(i)
∨
r∈Q
H(X)(rˆ) = >,
(ii)
∨
r∈Q
H(X)(rˆ)∗ = >,
(iii) (
∨
s∈Q:s<r
H(X)(sˆ)) = H(X)(rˆ),
(iv) H(X)(rˆ) = H(X)(rˆ)∗∗, ∀r ∈ Q.
Proof. Properties (i) and (iii) follow immediately from the defining properties of left conti-
nuous spectral families and the fact that δ preserves joins. Property (ii) follows from join
preservation and the fact that δ(a⊥) = δ(a)∗. To prove (iv), note that since the image of δ is
*-regular (Lemma 15), we have
H(X)(rˆ)∗∗ = δ(EXr )∗∗ = δ(EXr ) = H(X)(rˆ).
Definition 22. For any u ∈ V (Subcl(Σ)), define u∗ by dom(u∗) = dom(u) and u∗(v) = u(v)∗,
for all v ∈dom(u). We call u∗ the complement of u, and u∗∗ the regularisation of u. A real
number u ∈ R(Subcl(Σ)) is called regular if u∗∗ = u. Denote by R(Subcl(Σ))r the set of regular
elements of R(Subcl(Σ)).
Proposition 33. The mapping H : X 7→ H(X) maps SA(H) to R(Subcl(Σ))r , i.e.
H[SA(H)] ⊆ R(Subcl(Σ))r .
Proof. From proposition 31 and proposition 32 (i)-(iii), we have that H[SA(H)] ⊆
R(Subcl(Σ)). proposition 32 (iv) shows that H[SA(H)] ⊆ R(Subcl(Σ))r .
Proposition 34. For any family {Sj} ⊆ Subcl(Σ) satisfying S∗∗j = Sj for all j,
ε(
∨
j Sj) =
∨
j ε(Sj).
Proof. Let {Sj} ⊆ Subcl(Σ) satisfy the condition. Then
ε(
∨
j
Sj) = ε(
∨
j
S∗∗j ) = ε((
∧
j
S∗j )
∗) = ε(
∧
j
S∗j )
⊥
= (
∧
j
ε(S∗j ))
⊥ = (
∧
j
ε(Sj)
⊥)⊥ = (
∨
j
ε(Sj))
⊥⊥ =
∨
j
ε(Sj).
Definition 23. Given u ∈ R(Subcl(Σ)), define the P (H)-valued function F u on R by
F u(r) = ε(u(rˆ)).
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Proposition 35. The following properties hold for any u ∈ R(Subcl(Σ))r and r ∈ Q:
(i)
∨
r∈Q
F u(r) = >
(ii)
∧
r∈Q
F u(r) = ⊥
(iii)
∨
s∈Q:s<r
F u(s) = F u(r)
Proof. Let u ∈ R(Subcl(Σ))r and r ∈ Q. Since u(rˆ) is regular, it follows (from proposition 34)
that
(i)
∨
r∈Q
F u(r) =
∨
r∈Q
ε(u(rˆ)) = ε(
∨
r∈Q
u(rˆ)) = ε(>) = >,
(ii)
∧
r∈Q
F u(r) =
∧
r∈Q
ε(u(rˆ)) = (
∨
r∈Q
ε(u(rˆ))⊥)⊥ = (
∨
r∈Q
ε(u(rˆ)∗))⊥
= ε(
∨
r∈Q
u(rˆ)∗)⊥ = ε(>)⊥ = ⊥,
(iii)
∨
s∈Q:s<r
F u(s) =
∨
s∈Q:s<r
ε(u(sˆ)) = ε(
∨
s∈Q:s<r
u(sˆ)) = ε(u(rˆ)) = F u(r).
Theorem 36. Each u ∈ R(Subcl(Σ))r uniquely determines a corresponding self-adjoint operator
G(u) ∈ SA(H) defined by the left continuous spectral family
E
G(u)
r = F u(r) for each r ∈ R.
Proof. That {EG(u)r |r ∈ R} is a left continuous spectral family follows from proposition
35, and the spectral theorem entails that this family uniquely defines a corresponding self-
adjoint operator. To prove that the map G is injective, it remains to show that for any u, v ∈
R(Subcl(Σ))r , if F u(r) = F v(r), ∀r ∈ R, then ‖u = v‖ = >. So let u, v ∈ R(Subcl(Σ))r and
let F u(r) = F v(r), i.e. ε(u(rˆ)) = ε(v(rˆ)), ∀r ∈ R. It is easy to check that ‖u = v‖ =∧
q∈Q
u(qˆ)⇔ v(qˆ), which implies
> = ∧
q∈Q
ε(u(qˆ))↔ ε(v(qˆ)) = ∧
q∈Q
ε(u(qˆ)⇔ v(qˆ)) = ε( ∧
q∈Q
u(qˆ)⇔ v(qˆ)) = ε(‖u = v‖).
By the monotonicity of δ, this implies that ‖u = v‖ ≥ δ(ε(‖u = v‖)) = δ(>) = >, as
desired.
Theorem 36 shows that we can faithfully represent all regular reals in V (Subcl(Σ)) as self-
adjoint operators. The following theorem is a corollary:
Theorem 37. SA(H) and R(Subcl(Σ))r are in bijective correspondence.
Theorem 37 provides a precise clarification of the relationship between real numbers in
V (Subcl(Σ)) and self-adjoint operators on the relevant Hilbert space. Specifically, it shows that
the ‘regular reals’ in V (Subcl(Σ)) can always be used to represent the set SA(H).
34
7 Conclusion
In conclusion, we take the main results of the paper to be the following.
• The translation of the orthomodular structure of traditional quantum logic into a new
form of distributive and paraconsistent logic that arises naturally in the context of TQT.
• The introduction of the paraconsistent negation ∗ into the complete bi-Heyting algebra
Subcl(Σ) to be properly paraconsistent in the sense that S∧S∗ = ⊥ only if S ∈ {⊥,>}.
• The introduction of the commutativity relation into the complete bi-Heyting algebra
Subcl(Σ) expressed by the lattice operation and the paraconsistent negation ∗.
• The construction of the paraconsistent set theoretic structure V (Subcl(Σ)) and the deri-
vation of a ∆0-theorem transfer scheme that allows us to model major fragments of
classical set theory in V (Subcl(Σ)).
• The translation of the lattice-theoretic operations δ, ε into higher level set-theoretic maps
α, ω, which can subsequently be used to translate ideas and results between TQT and
QST.
• The precise characterisation of the relationship between real numbers in V (Subcl(Σ)) and
self-adjoint operators on the initial Hilbert space.
It goes without saying that this paper only represents a first step in the broader project of
unifying TQT and QST into a single overarching formal framework.
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